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This chapter analyses the change in the informal trafficking of standard consumer 
goods between Israel and the West Bank since summer 2007, when Palestinian 
Authority’s security forces were redeployed under the supervision of General Dayton. 
Based on an examination of the trafficking and the strategies developed by the traffickers, 
the Palestinian Authority’s capacity to territorialise its control in Palestinian enclaves will 
first be assessed. Changes in the nature of these transactions will then be studied to 
identify the new forms of regulation that are emerging between the Israeli and Palestinian 
economies, over and above formal exchanges. 
Starting in the 1990s new obstacles to movement began to appear within the 
Israeli-Palestine space: movements of people and goods which had hitherto been almost 
free became increasingly regulated and restricted. The obstacles were part of the Israeli 
separation policy, well before the launch of the Oslo negotiations (Handel, 2009, Havkin 
and Garb, in this volume). The boundaries defined by the creation of the Palestinian 
Authority’s zones of jurisdiction in the Gaza Strip and West Bank also have to be taken 
into consideration. Lastly, the Paris Protocol (1994) imposed new taxation rules on the 
transport of goods between Israel and the Palestinian Territories. 
Hence, certain local players had to reorganise to work around these limits or avoid 
the new regulations. A large number of movements and transactions that had previously 
been carried out in broad daylight and been tolerated by the Israeli authorities were 
gradually criminalised and hence went underground. But these limits and rules have not 
only erected obstacles; they have also caused the emergence of economic, legal and status 
differentials that Israeli and Palestinian economic players have exploited to develop 
informal activities and create more profit. The period of the Oslo Accords (1993-2000) 
thus saw the emergence of a “border economy” or more precisely, a “separation 
economy”, if we acknowledge that no internationally recognised borders exist today 
between Israel and the Palestinian territories. 
Research into such informal trade has mainly concentrated on the work around 
strategies Palestinian workers have used to keep on entering into Israel to work 
clandestinely, or the smugglers who facilitate their entry and exit (Bornstein, 2002, 
Parizot, 2006b, 2008b, Bontemps, 2009, Amiry, 2010). Some researchers have stressed 
the direct link between the reinforcement of Israeli security systems and the increased 
professionalism and organisation of the networks of traffickers (Parizot, 2008c, 2009b). 
As in other parts of the world, the increased “border” security and the differentials to 
which it gives rise have encouraged an increase in informal traffic (Andreas, 2001, 
Bennafla & Peraldi, 2008, Chandoul et al., 1991). Furthermore, such research shows the 
extent to which studying clandestine travel highlights the changes in the functioning of 
the power mechanisms deployed by Israel in the West Bank (Parizot, 2009b).  
In contrast, little work has focussed on the traffic in goods, or only on a very one-off 
basis concentrating on specific or localised trades such as that in cars stolen in Israel and 
sold in the Palestinian enclaves (Hertzog, 2005) or the trade in everyday consumer goods 
between the West Bank and north-eastern Negev (Parizot, 2006b, 2008b). These practices 
are often dealt with in the newspapers: journalists and researchers show how multiplying 
barriers in the Israeli and Palestinian territories encourages the development of informal 
activities.  
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This chapter continues this work by showing the close link between, on the one hand, the 
changes in limits and security systems and, on the other hand, the development of the 
traffic in goods. We will focus on the informal trade that channels everyday consumer 
goods between Israel and the Palestinian West Bank Territories. Taking as our subject 
such everyday traffic rather than gun-running, drug pushing or people-smuggling is more 
relevant in that it involves more people and is thus more likely to give an accurate 
account of the everyday lives of Palestinians and Israelis. Such informal trade is practised 
by ordinary people who become “suitcase traders”. When travelling, they take advantage 
of differentials in price, buying articles they can carry home to sell on their local markets. 
Some of them are also entrepreneurs who sell more specialist items such as building 
materials, electronics or medicines. In a word, they are as likely to trade in chocolate as 
in stolen Israeli cars that are sold for spares in the Palestinian Territories, in Israel itself 
and the neighbouring countries. Lastly, the diversity of these products' origins and 
destinations also demonstrates the extent to which this traffic is global. 
By assessing the ability of the Palestinian Authority to control the flow of goods 
that transit through the enclaves, our first objective will be to analyse the extent to which 
and precisely how it succeeds in asserting territorial control over its territories in the West 
Bank. Rather than adopting a normative approach, searching to define whether or not the 
Palestinian Authority has sufficient resources to achieve this goal, we will try to highlight 
the specific forms of this territorialisation. A comparison with that taken by Israeli control 
will help us determine the nature of territorial regime that has emerged in the Israeli and 
Palestinian territories in which there is not just a spatial separation between the 
populations, but also a ranking in their relations to space.  
Ariel Handel (2009) explains that Israeli security arrangements have a different 
effect on the capacity for movement of the Israeli and Palestinian populations: Israelis 
can move through a fluid, uninterrupted, predictable space that can be objectivised, 
particularly using modern cartographic science while Palestinians move in a fragmented, 
    
/BEBBAB	AB&E	ABEBF	ABBE	BBBBB		EA
	BE.E	F	AB*	ABB	BEB	EE	BBB	ABEBE	E			BB
E	BEE	ABBBB	BEB	AAAAE	BEBABB		ABBE	
BBE#+	ABF'DD0)"BBEBABEBBEBE		A		AB	E	EB	E		E	AB		B		AB
EBBE		A	BEEA	#.F'DD1)
unstable space. The time a journey takes depends both on the constant changes of 
obstacles’ location and the bio-social status of the traveller. Palestinian space is therefore 
intersubjective and maps are of no use. This research will show that the Israeli policy of 
separation does not simply create a structural inequality of use of space between Israeli 
and Palestinian citizens, but also an inequality in the implementation of control between 
the Israeli and Palestinian Authorities. 
The question of the territorialisation of control exercised by the Palestinian 
Authority has been particularly relevant since 2007 when draconian political measures 
were taken in order to restore its sovereignty. According to the plan promoted by the US 
General Dayton, and with the agreement of the Israelis, the various security services were 
allowed to leave their barracks and take over the management of security in the towns of 
Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Ramallah and Hebron. The objective of these redeployments 
was to strengthen the position of Mahmoud Abbas as Palestinian President and thus 
thwart Hamas who had just taken power in Gaza in June 2007 (Legrain, 2010). The 
redeployments were also presented as an additional stage in the process of building a 
future Palestinian State. Furthermore, the boycott campaign launched at the end of 2009 
by the government of Salam Fayyad on goods from the Israeli colonies marked a strong 
desire of the Palestinians to break their dependence on the Israeli economy and thus 
impose their own separation. But as we will show, the large-scale traffic of goods 
continued. It also appeared that the restrictions on movement and action imposed by 
Israel on the Palestinian police combined with the differentials created by the 
multiplication of limits since the time of the Oslo Accords encourage the continuation of 
such traffics, and even, their large-scale development. 
The second objective of this chapter will be to look at how this traffic can help us 
understand the changes in economic relations between the Israeli and Palestinian 
territories. Between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the decade starting in 
2000, Palestinian enclaves stopped being essential labour pools for Israeli companies. 
The importing of Asian, European and African labour greatly reduced the dependence of 
the Israelis on Palestinian workers (Kemp & Raijman, 2008). Furthermore, the 
Palestinian enclaves also became less attractive to Israeli companies seeking to outsource 
their business. During this period the major companies effectively outsourced production 
to Jordan, Egypt, Turkey and China where they could find much cheaper labour than in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Bouillon, 2006). This process led to the closure of 
many outsourcing workshops in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The proportion of 
imports from the Palestinian Territories has continued to diminish over the last thirty 
years to a point where it accounts for a limited share of all the goods imported into the 
Israeli market. In the first half of the 1980s, the proportion of imports – excluding 
diamonds2 – that come from the West Bank and Gaza varied between 2.5 and 3.5%, 
falling to 1.5% in the 1990s and then to 1% between 2000 and 2005 (Peres Center & 
Paltrade, 2006). 
In contrast, despite the policy of separation, the Palestinian market remains 
strategic for Israeli exporters. Although the proportion of Israeli exports to the Palestinian 
enclaves has dwindled as the conflict has worsened, the enclaves remain Israel's most 
important export market after the United States (Peres Center & Paltrade, 2006). The 
proportion of exports to the West Bank and Gaza Strip dropped from 12% – excluding 
diamonds – in 1987 to somewhere around 6.5% in 2005. As Lev Grinberg shows 
elsewhere in this volume, the Palestinian market remains captive to the Israeli economy. 
Taking this traffic as our starting-point we will try to identify what types of relation and 
regulation between the Israeli and Palestinian markets emerged at the end of the first 
decade of the third millennium over and above formal trade. 
This research is mainly based on data collected between 2007 and 2010 in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories of the West Bank and Israel. It was necessary to collect 
data from both sides in order to follow and understand the networks on which this 
informal trade depends. But we did not enjoy the same freedom of movement to 
undertake these investigations. Furthermore, given the impossibility of carrying out 
surveys in the Gaza Strip, we were obliged to limit this study to the trade between the 
West Bank and Israel. As a resident of the West Bank, Basel Natsheh, the joint author of 
this article with Cédric Parizot, cannot travel to Gaza. Moreover, he had to apply for a 
permit to visit Jerusalem and Israeli territory. But in 2008 he was only granted a one-
month permit limited to Jerusalem alone. The applications he made later with the backing 
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of the French Consulate with which he had work relations3 were routinely rejected 
without Basel being given any explanations. In contrast, although Cédric Parizot's French 
passport meant he was able to travel freely between Israel and the West Bank, in order to 
gain access to the Gaza Strip he had to submit to extremely complex administrative 
formalities the outcome of which was not guaranteed-. The mobility regime introduced 
by Israel since the 1990s therefore also affects the conditions under which research is 
done; most importantly it grades researchers’ accessibility to the field according to their 
status and identity.  
Our approach attempts to combine the two disciplines of anthropology and 
economic sociology. The data we present here come firstly from formal, semi-directive 
interviews with Palestinian customs and police officers as well as certain representatives 
of the Israeli authorities. We have also taken advantage of several visits by teams of 
French customs officers seconded as part of a training programme set up by ADETEF( to 
the Palestinian Ministry of Finance. Data was subsequently collected from Israeli and 
Palestinian players involved more or less actively in this informal trade. Our observation 
methods were therefore based on immersion and the sort of free-floating looking and 
listening used by anthropologists. 
We will first analyse the changes in the systems of Palestinian control since the 
Oslo Accords in the context of the readjustment of security measures imposed by Israel. 
We will try to show how existing security arrangements facilitate and maintain the 
development of the informal trade between Israel and the West Bank. We will then 
explain in more detail the nature of the traffic in order to understand the new forms of 
economic regulation they reveal between the Israeli and Palestinian markets, and beyond 
that, the forms of territorialisation of Palestinian control compared with those of Israeli 
control. 
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 I- “DETERRITORIALISED” PALESTINIAN CONTROL 
During the Second Intifada (2000-2005), the re-invasion of the Palestinian 
enclaves by the Israeli army greatly reduced the Palestinian Authority's capacity for 
action. The redeployments of 2007 enabled the Palestinian Authority (PA) to regain 
partial control over the major towns on the West Bank. But in 2010 the Palestinian police 
and customs services were still having difficulty extending their control in both space and 
time. The security measures imposed by Israel leave a number of gaps in which 
entrepreneurs of the informal economy can hide or extend their activities. In addition, 
incursions by the Israeli army regularly suspend action by the Palestinian police. The 
Palestinian customs and police are therefore unable to directly monitor the limits of the 
enclaves or the crossing points for goods and people entering or leaving them. Palestinian 
control is thus “deterritorialised”, not in the sense of breaking free of its territory to 
extend itself beyond it, but rather because it is incapable of deploying within the limits of 
that territory. 
 
Fragmented Control in both space and time 
During the 1990s the creation of zones under the jurisdiction of the PA in the West 
Bank resulted in a patchwork of enclaves surrounded by zones under Israeli authority. 
The West Bank was divided into three types of zone named A, B and C (see map 1). The 
A zones included more or less the centres of the six Palestinian towns of Jenin, Nablus, 
Tulkarem, Qalqiliya, Ramallah and Bethlehem1, while the fringes of these towns and 
nearly four hundred and fifty villages were defined as zones B. The zones C cover the 
remaining land in the West Bank including the Israeli settlements and the major roads. In 
the A zones, Israel delegated security and civil control to the Palestinian Authority; in the 
B zones, the Palestinian Authority was responsible for public order and the internal 
security of the Palestinians while Israel reserved the right to act on any questions of 
external security. Lastly, the C zones remained under Israeli control (Smith 2007, p. 462). 
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In 2000, on the eve of the Second Intifada, the A zones covered  17% and the B zones 
23% of the region.  
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This fragmentation set the Palestinian Authority a major problem in trying to control the 
flow of people and goods from one enclave to another. In fact it creates a system of 
refuge in that, including as they do some 60% of the West Bank, the C zones offer wide 
open spaces in which fugitives can flee the scrutiny of the Palestinian Authority or 
develop the activities it is trying to repress. This system also works in the opposite 
direction: starting in the second half of the 1990s, certain Israeli traffickers found in the 
autonomous Palestinian enclaves (A zones) refuges where they could evade control and 
pursuit by the Israeli police – particularly as Israeli citizens kept extraterritorial 
immunity. The Palestinian Authority has no powers to detain or try Israeli civilians who 
have committed offences in the A zones (Lia 2006, p. 290); their only possibility is to 
hand them over to the Israeli police.  
This system of refuge changed during the Second Intifada (2000-2005) when the 
Palestinian Authority saw its powers and fields of action greatly reduced. Coordination 
between the Israeli and Palestinian authorities broke down, reducing the number of 
Palestinian operations in the B zones or delaying their introduction. In 2002 the Israeli 
army started targeting the institutions of the Palestinian Authority, holding Yasser Arafat 
directly responsible for the second Palestinian uprising and the wave of suicide bombings 
in Israel (Cypel, 2005, p. 278). During “Operation Defensive Shield” (Hebrew: homat 
magen) in which the Israeli army again invaded the A zones, security coordination with 
the Palestinians was frozen and the Palestinian Authority's barracks and security 
institutions besieged. Despite the partial withdrawal of the Israeli army in the following 
years, the Palestinian police could no longer move about or act inside the A zones without 
prior authorisation from the Israeli army.  
In summer 2007 the Palestinian police force was redeployed in the A zones of the 
West Bank. The police engaged in direct confrontations with groups and institutions 
affiliated to Hamas (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2008). But regaining 
control over the enclaves has encountered several obstacles. The security arrangements 
imposed by Israel limit the Palestinian Authority's geographical capacity for action. 
Between 2009 and 2010 in the town of Hebron (Map 2) the Palestinian police were 
unable to deploy in the whole of zone H-1, which is the equivalent of an A zone. On the 
one hand, they could only send armed officers into an extremely limited area measuring 
1.8 square kilometres lying between avenues Ein Sara, as-Salam and Wadi At-Tufah. 
Outside this zone armed Palestinian units could only operate if they had prior 
authorisation from the coordination office (DCO) of the Israeli army, and then only for a 
limited period of time. In addition, they were totally prohibited from entering the 
industrial zone of Hebron.  
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The capacity for action of the Palestinian Authority was limited in time because it 
was regularly suspended by Israeli incursions. Considering the Palestinian forces' action 
against Hamas and other Islamist groups inadequate (Intelligence and Terrorism 
Information Center, 2008), the Israeli army regularly made incursions into the Palestinian 
enclaves. Every time an Israeli unit entered an A zone it ordered the Palestinian police 
force back to barracks. In July 2009 in zone H-1 the Palestinian police were ordered to 
suspend their activities more than twenty times0. In some West Bank towns these time 
restrictions have been defined on a fixed timetable. In 2007, between Tulkarem and Jenin, 
the security arrangements agreed between Israel and the Palestinians divided up the time 
 
0	BB	A	AB	B	AB9BE		%2A$"BAF:'DDC
during which the Palestinian authorities could act. They gave the Palestinian Authority 
total control between 6 a.m. and midnight, but imposed coordination with the Israelis 
during the hours of night (International Crisis Group, 2008, p. 13). Finally, the delays in 
implementing coordination between the Palestinian police and the Israelis constituted an 
additional time limit (Issacharoff and Azoulay, 2008). It sometimes needed hours, even 
days, for the Israeli coordination office to authorise the Palestinian police to act in a B 
zone or in restricted areas of A zones. This impossibility of acting immediately and the 
uncertain nature of Israeli reaction times thus prevented the Palestinian police taking 
advantage of timing to deploy control strategies. 
Consequently, whilst the campaign to restore Palestinian control over the large 
towns saw a certain return to order, the new security arrangements imposed by Israel 
during the post-Intifada period left the entrepreneurs of the informal economy more 
freedom of movement than the forces of the Palestinian Authority. At the same time, 
these security arrangements contributed to extending the refuge zones created during the 
Oslo Accords period. At this time these refuge zones lied in the C zones and certain B 
zones. From 2000 they grew to include more B zones and particularly the A zones. In 
autumn 2009 the Palestinian customs were no longer allowed to operate in the regions of 
Yatta and Samu to the south of Hebron even though they were in an A zone>. Similarly, 
even though it was in zone H-1 but out of bounds to the Palestinian police, the Industrial 
Zone to the south of Hebron has remained a favourite place to store smuggled and fake 
goods (Photo 1). The market inside zone H-2 controlled by the Israelis is also a notorious 
hideout for smugglers and those fleeing the Palestinian police.  
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Lastly, the traffickers in goods have also taken advantage of the priority given to security 
by the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority. The fight against armed Palestinian groups, 
whether carried out by the Israeli authorities trying to combat suicide bombings and 
maintain control over the region or the Palestinian Authority seeking to limit the action of 
groups who disagree with its political stance (Hamas and Islamic Jihad), thereby fail to 
act against breaches of ordinary law (Lia, 2006). In addition, the manipulation of 
smuggling networks (Parizot, 2008b, 2009b) offered some such networks a degree of 
protection and encouraged the spread of their activities.  
Customs without borders 
Depriving the Palestinian Authority of control over a large part of the West Bank, these 
security arrangements also prevent customs officials and customs police from controlling 
the entrances to and in the periphery of the Palestinian enclaves. Firstly, the fringes of the 
enclaves are often categorized as B zones. Unless the Israeli army gives its permission, 
the Palestinian Authority has no way of setting up barriers or points of control to check 
what goods are entering or leaving an enclave. In December 2009, of the ninety-seven 
points of entry to the city of Hebron only fifteen were monitored by Palestinians, but the 
customs police could only act freely on eight of them: any action regarding the other 
seven required coordination with the Israeli authorities. There are a number of routes 
open to smugglers to evade surveillance by the customs police. This is particularly true in 
a situation where, on the one hand the isolation of the enclaves from one another 
multiplies the zones of contact between the regions under Israeli and Palestinian control 
and, on the other, the customs police are understaffed, having no more than two hundred 
and fifty employees in the entire West Bank.  
Nor have the Palestinians any control over the points of entry for goods once they 
have crossed the Green Line, the former armistice line distinguishing internationally 
recognised Israeli territory from the occupied West Bank. As part of the implementation 
of the policy of separation and the construction of the Wall, the Israeli army set up six 
crossing points in the “seam zone” to ensure the transit of goods in and out of Israel (Map 
3): Tarqûmiya (west of Hebron), Betunia (south of Ramallah), Taybeh/Sha’ar Ephraim 
(south-east of Tulkarem), Al Jalameh (north of Jenin) and Bisan/Beit She’an (north of the 
Jordan Valley). Located in a C zone, they are managed solely by Israelis. Until 2006 they 
were run by the army but the privatisation of the checkpoints resulted in them being 
transferred to private companiesC.  
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The lack of immediate control over these crossing points reduces the power of the 
Palestinian Authority in applying its fiscal controls. Traders take advantage of this, 
frequently under-declaring the value of their goods; this is particularly easy to do as the 
crossing-point staff are more concerned with security checks than VAT declarations. The 
employees are even less motivated in performing this work of checking given that Israel 
receives nothing from these declarations and the VAT paid by Palestinian carriersD. 
Palestinian traders therefore take few risks in marking down the value of their goods in 
order to reduce their tax payments.  
Nor do the customs police control the points of arrival and transit of goods 
imported from abroad. In accordance with the Paris Protocol (1994), goods imported by 
Palestinian traders transit via the Israeli ports of Ashdod and Haifa. A certain quantity of 
foodstuffs may also come from Jordan via the Al-Karameh/Allenby crossing point. As 
these ports and crossing points are under Israeli control, customs declarations and claims 
for exoneration of customs duties by Palestinian traders are therefore made through 
Israeli customs. The Israelis then give the merchants a form that they have to hand in to 
the Palestinian customs personally. Given the fact that there is no interface between 
Israeli and Palestinian databases, the Palestinian Authority only has these paper 
declarations on which to work out how much tax is due to them each month. Badly filled-
in forms do not always state the precise volume and value of the goods concerned. And 
given that the Israeli public and private institutions often overlook scrutinising such 
customs declarations, traders are  tend to under-declare the volume and value of their 
goods. As the Israeli authorities derive no significant profit from these declarations, once 
again they are not motivated to be over-zealous.  
At the end of the day, marking down the value of goods or concealing their real 
nature is facilitated by the legal provisions governing the procedure for declaring taxes 
and customs on the Palestinian side. Once their goods have gone through the Israeli ports 
and checkpoints, Palestinian traders have forty-five days to make their declaration to the 
customs office in their region. Therefore unless they get caught by the customs police at 
the entrance to a Palestinian town, most traders have enough time to get rid of their goods 
before they have to declare them to customs. As a result, apart from the declarations 
presented to the Israelis by traders and those transferred to them by the Israelis, the 
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Palestinian customs authorities have no way of checking that the effective nature and 
value of the goods match the declarations made by the trader or carrier.  
Lastly, the considerable distance between the checkpoints and the destination of 
the goods – Palestinian enclaves or Israeli settlements – and the fact that traders handle 
both Israeli and Palestinian goods means that they can switch from the very tightly 
controlled system imposed on Palestinian goods to the much freer system designed for 
Israeli products. The example of Sâlim as-Sharârke is particularly illuminating: a 
resident of Yatta, he built his house in 2007. At that time the steel used in the building 
industry was cheaper in Israel than in the Palestinian Territories. Sâlim ash-Sharârke 
therefore bought several tonnes of steel from an Israeli entrepreneur in Beersheba, Moshe 
Azoulay, who drew up a bogus invoice made out to an Israeli living in the settlement of 
Ma’on which is south of the Palestinian town of Yatta (see map 4). 
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Officially intended for an Israeli settlement, the consignment had to go through the 
control system imposed on goods destined for the settlements: it was therefore able to 
evade the restrictions and checks to which goods going to the Palestinian enclaves are 
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subject. On the Israeli side, the lorry used to carry the steel managed to evade the security 
checks at the Tarqûmiya checkpoint. Being destined to an Israeli settlement, it did not 
have to submit to the back-to-back procedure applied to Palestinian merchandises12. 
Instead it was able to take a much faster road, namely that used by the Israelis to reach 
the settlements of Susia, Ma’on and Karmel in Beersheba, passing through the checkpoint 
of Meitar/Wadi al-Khalîl much further south than that at Tarqûmiya. It was then able to 
go straight through the checkpoint and take Routes 60 and 317 to reach the Israeli 
settlement of Ma’on. But instead of continuing to Ma’on he entered the Palestinian 
enclave of Yatta via an entry that is not controlled by the Palestinian Authority. As the 
periphery of this enclave is defined as a B zone, the customs police cannot set up 
checkpoints on it. To summarize, by using this informal way of importing his steel, Sâlim 
benefited in three ways: he acquired the goods more cheaply than those sold locally in the 
Palestinian enclaves, he slashed his transport costs and also avoided paying VAT because 
the goods were officially destined for an entrepreneur and not a private individual.  
The tax arrangements between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli authorities 
defined by the Oslo Accords as well as the security systems deployed by Israel during the 
decade from 2000 were paradoxical in their effects. On the one hand they constituted an 
obstacle to the development of trade between the West Bank and the outside world. The 
back-to-back system of transferring products has slowed down flow, damaged foodstuffs 
and pushed prices up (Paltrade, 2009). On the other hand, because they prioritise security 
and keep the Palestinian customs at bay, they open the way to various forms of traffic. 
Firstly, the location on the seam zone rather than at the entrance to the Palestinian 
enclaves reduces Palestinian control over the validity of the declared value of goods and, 
secondly, the Israeli capacity to check the final destination of vehicles carrying goods on 
the Palestinian side. On leaving the checkpoint, a lorry may either head towards an Israeli 
settlement or a Palestinian enclave (see the article by Garb in this volume). These 
configurations therefore encourage fraud in the control systems: firstly in terms of the 
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value and type of goods and, secondly, the identification and destination of the products 
(Israeli or Palestinian). 
The fight against the circumvention of control and fraud in the control systems 
has proved particularly difficult due to the fact that there is very little coordination 
between the Israelis and Palestinians. Combined with the Palestinians’ limited capacity to 
collect information, the lack of coordination constitutes a major obstacle for the 
Palestinians in terms of projecting control beyond the enclaves into the heart of the 
informal networks. This is particularly true given that the customs authorities do not have 
a very developped or structured system of informers. Since they lack  financial means 
they cannot recruit informers on a regular basis. Moreover, due to the fact they have no 
control over the means of communication or the borders, it is difficult for them to 
manipulate the smugglers to obtain information on their rivals. Even though they are 
considered an authority regulating crossings between the enclaves and zones controlled 
by Israel, they do not have the same powers as the Israelis who are able to negotiate the 
closure or opening of channels with one set of players in exchange for information on the 
activities of others. 
 
II- INFORMAL TRADE AND NEW ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC 
REGULATION 
The study of traffic developed by Israeli and Palestinian traders to ship products 
into the West Bank Palestinian enclaves enables us to assess the unilateral character of 
the separation. In the absence of borders and controls on the periphery of the enclaves, 
the Palestinian Authority does not have any real means of regulating the Israeli products 
coming onto its markets – which explains why the Palestinian economy remains largely 
enslaved to the Israeli economy.  
However, unlike the Oslo Accords period (1993-2000), new forms of economic 
regulation have appeared: the context of crisis in the Palestinian enclaves and the new 
security arrangements, together with the legal and tariff differentials they create, open the 
way to new traffic which  builds upon the new economic complementarities between 
Israeli and Palestinian territories.  
 
Palestinian enclaves: a continuing “captive” market  
Products smuggled from Israeli zones to the Palestinian enclaves include all types 
of everyday consumer goods: foodstuffs (mineral water, confectionery, meat, flour, eggs, 
etc.), toys, tobacco (cigarettes, hookah tobacco), clothes, cosmetics, pharmaceutical 
products. They can be found on most Palestinian stalls and markets. Because they are part 
of the informal economy it is difficult to evaluate volumes accurately. Apart from the loss 
in taxes they represent, such products pose a real problem to health and public safety: 
certain traffickers take advantage of the customs officials’ inability to control health and 
technical standards to introduce perished or defective products into the enclaves.  
This type of traffic existed well before the creation of the Palestinian Authority in 
1994. It was reduced in the second half of the 1990s following police and customs 
pressure before developing once again during the Second Intifada. Between 2000 and 
2005 the Israeli army besieged the forces of the Palestinian Authority or subjected them 
to strict limitations on movement. The Israeli army, which was focused on fighting the 
Palestinian resistance, was set up in and around the enclaves and did not intervene against 
the smugglers. On the contrary, certain groups were instrumentalized in order to rebuild 
or reinforce the networks of informers set up by the Israeli intelligence services. During 
this period people started noticing the massive arrival of perished foodstuffs such as 
meat, milk and vegetables (Laban, 2005). From 2007 onwards the partial takeover of A 
zones in the West Bank has enabled the Palestinian authorities to resume the fight against 
smuggling. However this has proved particularly difficult because punishment for these 
crimes is still based on Jordanian laws prior to 1967, which do not condemn practices 
such as “re-labelling” of goods. In order to evade controls by the Palestinian Authority 
certain entrepreneurs specialise in manufacturing packaging and labels to repackage 
goods that have been tampered with. Lastly, due to the precarious economic situation of 
the Palestinian population there is still considerable demand for cheap smuggled goods.  
The trade in cars intended for the breaker’s yard in Israel but which are sold in the 
Palestinian enclaves is another example of how Israeli products are “recycled”. The 
traffic is all the more difficult to combat because it also plays on the duplication of 
control systems and that of Israeli and Palestinian areas of jurisdiction. Palestinian 
mechanics  buy the cars from Israeli mechanics for spare parts. The cars are then shipped 
legally into the Palestinian enclaves. The real traffic only begins when a Palestinian 
trader sells a car to a customer who uses it to drive around in. Such cars or lorries are still 
being sold in B and C zones to Palestinians who do not have the money to buy a vehicle 
registered with the Ministry of Transport. The owners of such vehicles can drive without 
much fear of being stopped: other than in the large Palestinian towns where the 
Palestinian police make frequent confiscations (Ma’an News Agency, 2009), it is 
impossible or difficult to check such vehicles. And this trade is encouraged when the 
Israeli police show a certain degree of tolerance towards drivers provided they do not 
drive on the main highways used by the Israeli settlers. In certain zones, such as the south 
of the Hebron mountains or in certain villages to the west of Ramallah, we observed that 
these vehicles account for over half of the cars on the road.  
The fight against such informal trade is particularly difficult because Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank often act as support or transit bases. Israeli settlers are 
sometimes the main players in the traffic, trading directly in products manufactured in the 
settlements. This trade began when the first Israeli settlements were created in the 1970s. 
In the south of the Hebron mountains the settlements often sell their livestock (cattle, 
sheep, poultry) and milk to the Palestinian populations in the region, those in the Jordan 
Valley supply the Palestinian towns and villages with their fruit and vegetable products 
while those in the Ariel region to the south of Nablus trade in manufactured goods. 
The Palestinian Authority began fighting this type of trade in the 1990s due to its 
informal nature and the financial losses incurred. In 2009 the fight took on a political 
dimension. On 8 December 2009, Salam Fayyad's government officially announced a 
boycott of these products, promising to remove them from Palestinian shops. In January 
2010 the Palestinian Prime Minister set up a special fund to support this cause and in 
May he launched an awareness campaign while on the ground, the Palestinian customs 
officials increased their efforts. 
The challenge remains, however, difficult to meet. Even though the networks of 
police informers often enable goods to be tracked, the police are unable to intervene on 
the outskirts of the enclaves and their entry points and can only act once the goods arrive 
in the Palestinian shops. The customs police cannot launch an operation to intercept trade 
in the Israeli towns or on the main highways in the West Bank. Palestinian traders may 
therefore load and ship products without any fear of getting caught. The overlap between 
Israeli and Palestinian territories also increases the points of contact between the 
settlements and enclaves. In Hebron the situation is particularly significant: settlements 
are located both around and inside the city itself and provide both support bases and 
many points of entry to the markets of the Palestinian town.  
The boycott announced by the Fayyad government has therefore had a more 
political than economic impact. In a situation in which the Palestinian customs police 
have only limited control on the enclave boundaries and points of entry, the only 
possibility of effectively implementing such a boycott is to ensure an awareness 
campaign is organised successfully. The value of Palestinian customs police takings 
remains limited compared to trade values: in May 2010 the takings totalled 5 million 
dollars (Zacharia, 2010), whereas as annual sales of this type of product total 200 million 
dollars in the West Bank. The simple fact of having to appeal to the people to fight the 
import of products from the settlements is another illustration of the Palestinian 
Authority’s weak capacity to protect its market.  
The interceptions mainly affect small companies and farms in the settlements for 
which trade with the Palestinian enclaves accounts for a significant proportion of their 
business. On the other hand they have less impact on companies with a larger turnover 
for whom trade with the enclaves is secondary. In economic terms, the effects of the 
boycott are consequently sporadic. At political level protests by settlers running small 
farms have  triggered angry reactions within the Netanyahu administration. But this 
mobilisation is linked more to the capacity for mobilisation and pressure from Israeli 
settlers than the impact of the boycott policy. To summarise, unless there is massive 
mobilisation by the Palestinian population as part of the boycott, it is unlikely to achieve 
its goal. 
 
Globalisation of the border economy 
Far from restricting itself to the Israeli and Palestinian territories, the traffic in 
everyday consumer goods is becoming part of international informal trade: from the mid 
1990s onwards the increasing number of legal differentials between the Israeli and 
Palestinian territories and the superimposition of control systems promoted the 
development of new informal trading that would go on to become international. We will 
focus on two types of trade: those in stolen cars and fake goods. In both cases the 
enclaves act as transit zones for the development of informal trade in Israel or between 
Israel and other countries. Trafficking therefore shows not only that new forms of 
complementarity are emerging between the Israeli and Palestinian markets but that the 
complementarities between these two spaces are also used by international smuggling 
networks. This process therefore marks a globalisation of the Israeli-Palestinian border 
economy. 
When the Palestinian Authority’s zones of jurisdiction were defined, the enclaves 
became strategic zones for the development of car theft and the informal market in spare 
parts. Lorries and cars stolen in Israel were dispatched to the enclaves either to have a 
makeover and be sold to private individuals or to be broken up into spare parts. Vehicles 
were mainly sold in the heart of the Palestinian market while spare parts were intended 
for both the Palestinian and Israeli markets. Because the Israeli police refused to 
intervene in the enclaves, in the initial years of the peace process the enclaves could act 
as hiding places. In the Gaza Strip, Palestinians trafficking vehicles felt safe once they 
were over the “border” (Abu Moaleik, 2004). In the West Bank spare parts dealers began 
running massive open-air breakers yards. Between 1993 and 1997 the trafficking grew 
considerably: the number of vehicles stolen in Israel went from just under twenty-five 
thousand to over forty-five thousand a year3. 
During the Second Intifada (2000-2005) the lockdowns and restrictions on 
movement imposed by the army between the Occupied Territories and  Israel reduced the 
trafficking. From 2002, the invasion of the Palestinian enclaves enabled the Israeli police 
to confiscate directly in A and B zones of the West Bank over one thousand six hundred 
vehicles stolen in Israel (Shahar, 2003). The number of cars stolen each year fell to 
around twenty-five thousand in 2004 (Katz et al., 2006). The Israeli police have since 
continued to intervene regularly in the Palestinian enclaves. The operations are led by the 
Etkar unit. This unit, which specialises in the fight against car theft, was created in 1998 
and dismantled in 2004 due to budget cuts. It was finally reinstated in 2005 when 40% of 
its budget was funded by Israeli insurance companies. It has since operated unilaterally 
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without any coordination with the Palestinian Authority-. Since 2007 car thieves have 
also had to deal with the Palestinian police who have also adopted a more 
uncompromising attitude (Ma’an News Agency, 2009).  
Traffickers have continued operating despite increasingly difficult conditions. In 
terms of value, i.e. in proportion to the number of vehicles on the Israeli roads, action by 
the Israeli and Palestinian police has reduced the number of thefts to a level lower than 
that of 1994. According to Israeli police statistics, whereas in 1994, 19.4 vehicles in every 
thousand were stolen, in 2009 the figure was only 9.8. On the other hand in terms of 
volume the number of stolen vehicles remains higher than in 1994: less than twenty-five 
thousand compared with approximately thirty thousand in 2007(.  
It is particularly difficult to stop such trafficking, firstly due to the territorial and 
security situation. The overlapping zones of jurisdiction and the many crossings between 
them make it difficult to control vehicles, which also increases the number of crossing 
and circumvention points (Barthe, 2007). Secondly, this battle can only produce 
significant results provided the Israeli police reserves the unilateral right to intervene 
directly and frequently in the Palestinian enclaves, as it has done since the Second 
Intifada.  
There is still considerable demand while the traffickers create complex networks 
involving Israeli and Palestinian collaboration. Certain networks are currently run by 
large Israeli families who subcontract to petty criminals from various countries1. Most 
trafficking of stolen cars is nowadays structured by the demands of the Israeli market, 
which is the traffickers' main outlet: it supplies the Israeli mechanics who provide their 
customers with spare parts. The cars are stolen in Israel by Israelis who leave them in 
specific places. They are then taken by an Israeli or Palestinian driver to a breakers yard 
in the West Bank where they are taken apart. The breakers yards are often located outside 
the range of the Palestinian police or are protected by corrupt police officers. Lastly, the 
parts are shipped in small quantities to Israeli garages that specialise in selling spares. 
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More often than not they are carried in private vehicles through Israeli checkpoints along 
the Separation Wall. The system is so efficient that an Israeli mechanic in Tel Aviv can 
order a part in the morning and have it delivered via the West Bank the same evening.  
The traffic is becoming international. Since about 2005, spare parts that were 
previously intended for the Israeli and Palestinian markets alone have been exported by 
some networks to neighbouring Arabic countries. In 2006 the Etkar unit intercepted a 
network of traffickers exporting spare parts to Jordan and then on to Iraq (Katz et al., 
2006). 
The West Bank has also become a transit zone for importing fake goods to Israel. 
These are mainly Chinese clothes imported into A zones and then forwarded to Israel. In 
2009 Israeli traders often took advantage of weaknesses in the system of separation to 
import copies of various brands (Fila, Adidas, Nike, etc.) from China. To do this they 
used Palestinian intermediaries they asked for help: the intermediaries had to contact the 
Chinese factories that subcontract for the brands and order batches of sports shoes 
manufactured over and above the quotas determined by the brand. Because they came 
straight from the factory, the shoes could be purchased at a lower cost from the Israeli 
franchises. Once they left the factory, the batches were loaded into a container in the 
name of a Palestinian trader and forwarded to the Port of Ashdod and finally shipped to 
the West Bank. After the goods had gone through customs at Ashdod the traders were 
faced with two possibilities: the container was either sent to Hebron so that the fake shoes 
could then be sent to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa or another Israeli city, or the container 
was unloaded on the way and shipped straight to one of these cities, the rest of the 
container being sent to Hebron. The fake shoes were intended for shops that were well 
established and were therefore sold alongside shoes that were legally imported. 
Working with Palestinians minimised the risks taken by the Israeli sponsors. 
Palestinian goods could not be penalised because they were not subject to Israeli 
commercial legislation, and there were no Palestinian regulations governing fakes. If the 
Israeli customs found any illegal products, the only risk was that the goods would be 
destroyed. Since late 2009 and early 2010 however, Israeli customs have become more 
vigilant and stricter in resisting this type of trade: containers of clothes are opened much 
more frequently and inspected more carefully. In order to cope with the increased 
surveillance traders have set up new strategies: they are importing increasing numbers of 
unlabelled products and labelling them in the Palestinian enclaves or Israel. This is 
particularly easy because since the 1990s many factories in the West Bank have 
specialised in producing fake labels (Nike, Caterpillar, Timberland, Adidas, Lacoste, 
Tommy Hilfiger, etc.).  
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The production of fake labels in the Palestinian enclaves has developed since the 
1990s in a context that has seen a considerable drop in the demand for textiles in the local 
workshops. The fact that Asian markets are now open to Israel following the Oslo 
Accords (1994-2000)0 has enabled Israeli entrepreneurs to relocate their production, 
which previously took place in factories and workshops in the West Bank, to countries 
such as Jordan, Turkey and China (Bouillon, 2006). Israeli entrepreneurs were attracted 
by both the cheap labour and the fact that the goods could be shipped very easily between 
these markets and Israel. In the second half of the 1990s the implementation of the Israeli 
closure policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip affected the movement of people and 
goods. To avoid closing down their workshops and factories, certain Palestinian 
entrepreneurs began producing labels in the A zones. The absence of Palestinian 
legislation on fake goods and the difficulty of access for the Israeli police offered total 
impunity. The production was mainly used by Palestinian traders who wanted to add 
value to the goods they sold in a market where the demand for international brands is 
constantly increasing. The rest was intended for the Israeli market. 
The development in the traffic of fake products and labels between Israeli and 
Palestinian territories and countries like China shows how certain economic players have 
managed to grasp the opportunities presented by the system of separation to ensure their 
continued economic survival or to create more profits. In the West Bank they enable 
many of them to continue business in a context where Palestinian entrepreneurs are 
 
0Following the launch of the Oslo Accords the State of Israel has managed to develop economic and commercial 
relations with countries that previously refused to trade with it. 

needed less and less to perform subcontracting work for the Israeli market. In Israel 
trafficking enables certain Israeli traders to increase their margins either to bear the cost 
of the competition or to make more profit. In a way, trafficking is part of a process proper 
to globalisation described as the “informalisation” of the formal sector. In other words, to 
cope with competition entrepreneurs include more and more informal trading in their 
formal business (Mercier, 2009). The development and structuring of the manufacturing 
and trading environments support the process by which the production systems and 
economies are informalised. These environments are concentrated in different areas of 
the territory and they develop their activities (manufacture, commerce, production of 
industrial parts, etc.) within  production sites and/or market places that generate 
transnational systems for the movement of people, goods and capital.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In 2010 the policies the Palestinian Authority implemented to control the flow of 
goods and people remain very de-territorialised. This de-territorialisation is not 
synonymous with power: it does not refer to the capacity to break geographical 
boundaries, but to the Palestinian Authority’s inability to project control over its territory 
or stabilise it over time. This perspective makes it possible to better assess the limits of 
the redeployment of Palestinian forces since summer 2007, which have created the 
illusion that Mahmoud Abbas’ power and sovereignty have been restored within the 
enclaves of the West Bank. In actual fact the security measures maintained by Israel have 
not enabled such a process to come to fruition. As portrayed by the media, the 
redeployment of Palestinian forces in the West Bank has given a false view of the 
situation, thereby contributing indirectly to accentuating the blurring of the limits and 
position of players in the conflict.  
The de-territorialisation of Palestinian control is in sharp contrast to that of Israeli 
control. Even though the Palestinians may be unable to forward plan in terms of space 
and time, the Israelis, on the other hand, maintain firm control over 60% of the West 
Bank, i.e. in the C zones that include the main highways and zones administered by the 
settlements. Furthermore, the Israeli army has displaced its long-term control beyond the 
boundaries defined during the Oslo Accords period because not only does it frequently 
intervene in the A and B zones of the Palestinian enclaves, but also because it regulates 
the movements of the Palestinian Authority in the A zones.  
The imbalance between Israelis and Palestinians in the territorialisation of control 
shows that the Israeli separation policy has produced a territorial regime that cannot be 
understood using the categories of analysis proper to the political imagination of the 
modern State. The separation does not result in the emergence of two separate territories 
in which only the control of the State that claims prevails. On the contrary, it maintains a 
single territory in which several players with unequal degrees of power, i.e. Israelis, 
Palestinians, international players, smugglers, etc., act. 
Depending on their identity and the zone in question, the movement of people or 
goods is likely to be monitored and defined by the Israelis and/or the Palestinian 
Authority. The way in which the regime actually operates appears even more complex if 
the intervention of the other formal and informal players involved is taken into 
consideration. In the previous chapter Yaacov Garb highlighted the various players 
involved in the formal management of goods shipped between Israel and the West Bank. 
In the present chapter we have emphasized the role of the “informal entrepreneurs” of the 
separation. They should also be taken into consideration given that, by making it easier to 
work around the physical and legal obstacles, they also participate in regulating the 
crossings. 
The power to regulate of these informal entrepreneurs in the informal market is 
particularly significant as it directly affects the restructuring of relations between the 
Israeli and Palestinian economies. These entrepreneurs play on the legal, commercial and 
fiscal differentials between the territories and control systems and help create new forms 
of complementarity between Israeli and Palestinian markets. As we have shown, they 
help maintain the Palestinian market not only as a captive market but as a market in 
which perished and defective goods are recycled. They also contribute to maintaining 
trade between the Israeli settlements and Palestinian enclaves, which the Palestinian 
Authority finds very difficult to combat. Lastly, they give the enclaves the status of transit 
zones. This trafficking concerns more players as it does not only affect those involved in 
the informal economy. In an increasingly globalised context, such types of trade are 
becoming more and more strategic, both for large and small entrepreneurs, in Israel and 
the Palestinian enclaves alike. 
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